

Message Text

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ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SAJ-01 IO-12 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-09 H-02

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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3182

C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 3401

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CH, UR

SUBJ: CALL ON PRC AMBASSADOR

REF: KABUL 3141

1. I MADE MY RETURN CALL ON PRC AMBASSADOR KAN YEH- TAO AT THE PRC EMBASSY. WHEN HE HAD MADE HIS INITIAL CALL ON ME IN MY CAPACITY AS DEAN OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS, I HAD TRIED TO TAKE HIM UP ON A PREVIOUS SUGGESTION FOR POLITICAL CONVERSATION BUT AT THAT TIME FOUND HIM EVASIVE. EVIDENTLY BY NOW HE HAD RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS AND INITIATED THE CONVERSATION.

2. ACCORDING TO THE PRC AMBASSADOR, THE USSR IS THE GREATEST DESTABILIZING FORCE IN THE WORLD BECAUSE IT IS TRYING TO ENCROACH ON OTHER COUNTRIES. WHEN I ASKED IF HE CONSIDERED USSR WAS FOLLOWING A " NEW IMPERIALISM", PRC AMBASSADOR READILY AGREED. HOWEVER, HE ADDED PRC IS PATIENT. IF IT IS THREATENED IT REJECTS THE THREAT, AND IF IT WERE TO BE ATTACKED IT WOULD NOT BE AFRAID.

3. I ASKED IF I WAS TO INTERPRET THE AMBASSADOR' S COMMENT TO MEAN THAT HE REGARDED THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE PRC AS THE MOST ACUTE THREAT TO PEACE. THE PRC AMBASSADOR BACKED OFF FROM A DIRECT REPLY BUT SAID HE HAD TO ADMIT THAT NO PROGRESS HAD BEEN ACHIEVED IN USSR- PRC CONTACTS AND NEGOTIATIONS.

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HE THEN REPEATED HIS REMARK ABOUT CHINA'S PATIENCE AND THE REST. WHATEVER THE RUSSIANS WERE DOING, GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS MOVED IN THE " RIGHT DIRECTION" (I. E., THE DIRECTION DESIRED BY THE PRC).

4. I ASKED THE AMBASSADOR WHAT CONTRIBUTIONS THE US COULD MAKE TO PEACE IN HIS OPINION. HE REPLIED THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS OVER VIETNAM SERVE AS AN EXAMPLE AND THAT THEY HAVE HAPPILY ENDED WITH THE USG DECISION TO WITHDRAW. I ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION AND WHETHER HE MEANT THAT THE US SHOULD WITHDRAW ELSEWHERE. THE PRC AMBASSADOR STATED EMPHATICALLY THAT HE WAS TALKING WITHIN A GENERAL HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK AND DID NOT WANT TO BE SPECIFIC AS TO TIME AND PLACE. HE WAS GIVING ME HIS " PERSONAL" GENERAL ORIENTATION, BUT CLEARLY THESE WERE ALL IMPORTANT AND COMPLEX QUESTIONS OVER WHOSE SOLUTION THERE WAS " NO HURRY."

5. I THEN ASKED ABOUT THE PRESENT DIFFICULTIES AND CONTINUED ACTIONS OF FORCE THROUGHOUT THE INDO- CHINA AREA. IN RESPONSE THE PRC AMBASSADOR DIFFERENTIATED AS FOLLOWS: FOR VIETNAM THERE SHOULD BE STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF PARIS TALKS, BUT HE CONTINUES TO BE HOPEFUL. AS TO LAOS, THE SOLUTION LAY IN NON- INTERFERENCE BY OUTSIDERS. (NOTE PLURAL.) THE CAMBODIAN CASE HE PRONOUNCED AS " EASIEST." ALL THAT WAS REQUIRED WAS TO STOP SUPPORTING LON NOL GOVERNMENT, (HE REFUSED TO NAME US) AND THEN ALL WOULD BE SETTLED VERY QUICKLY.

6. REGARDING CONDITIONS ON THE SUB- CONTINENT, HE EMPHASIZED ONCE AGAIN DESTABILIZING ROLE OF THE USSR AND POINTED ESPECIALLY TO INDO- SOVIET TREATY. SECONDLY, HE CONDEMNED ATTITUDE OF INDIA AND BANGLA DESH ON QUESTION OF THE POW'S AS " INSINCERE" AND " TRICKY." PRC WILL NOT CHANGE ITS ATTITUDE UNTIL THEY (INDIA AND BANGLA DESH) HAVE CHANGED THEIR ATTITUDES ON THIS QUESTION. POW PROBLEM IS THE KEY ISSUE.

7. ON MIDDLE EAST, PRC AMBASSADOR SAID THAT IT PRESENTED MANY DIFFICULTIES, BUT MORE IMPORTANT WAS THE SITUATION IN EUROPE. IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION, HE SAID HE DID NOT MEAN TO SAY THAT THERE WAS AN IMMINENT DANGER OF CONFLICT IN EUROPE, BUT THAT THE EUROPEAN SITUATION ONLY " SEEMED" LESS TENSE BECAUSE OF A SERIES OF ADJUSTMENTS MADE BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE US. HOWEVER, THERE WAS TENSION UNDERNEATH. HE COULD NOT BE DRAWN OUT ON ANY FURTHER ELABORATION.

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8. IN THE COURSE OF A FURTHER CONVERSATION ON RESPECTIVE AID PROGRAMS IN AFGHANISTAN, PRC AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED HIS COUNTRY'S WILLINGNESS TO RENDER MORE ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN WITHIN PRC'S ABILITY AND AFGHANISTAN'S NEEDS. HE EXPRESSED SOME BEWILDERMENT AS TO HOW BEST TO KNOW WHAT PROJECTS TO UNDERTAKE. NEUMANN

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